The Problem of Evil: The Hitler Example

Over at Unreasonable Faith, the author posts a quote from another blog: "There were 42 failed attempts to kill Hitler…. If there is a God seated on his Royal Throne in Heaven, why did he not let [one of them succeed]?"

While one could answer this from a religious standpoint, but why waste our time?  A G.E. Moore switch here, a defense of free will there -- when, really, it all comes down to what's known as the Problem of Evil.  Most critical thinkers have probably pondered something similar in their lifetime.  Just today, before I read the post at Unreasonable Faith, I was reading about a suicide bomber destroying an Iraqi restaurant and killing half a hundred people, and the Problem of Evil popped into my brain.  Why does this happen?  If there is a God, why do people have to suffer or die before their time?  It's the same sort of reasoning that lead Nietzsche to proclaim that "God is dead".  The problem is this:  God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, and there is evil in the world.  This is used as an argument against the existence of God, and it goes as follows:

1) An omnibenevolent god would want to eliminate as much evil as he could

2) An omnipotent god would be able to eliminate all the evil he knows about

3) An omniscient god would know about all the evil in the world

4) Therefore, if god exists, there would be no evil in the world

5) There is evil in the world
6) Therefore, god does not exist

This shows that one cannot believe that god is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent and also believe that there is evil in a world, as it is a contradiction.  There are some arguments against this from both theists and atheists.  An atheist might claim that there is no such thing as evil, and the concept is merely an illusion.  Experience in the world would show otherwise.  Evil is similar to love in that it's undefinable but you know it's there and you know what it is.  

Agnostics or even some theists might claim that god exists, but he's not omnipotent or omnibenevolent or omniscient.  This, too, is basically untenable, as if god is not these things, then he is not really what one would define god to be.  Ergo, stating that god is not omnipotent, omnibenevolent, or omniscient is tantamount to denying god's existence.  

Here's where this gets interesting (to nerds like me, anyway).  There is an entire word devoted to this argument: theodicy.  A theodicy is a defense of god's goodness in light of the fact of evil.  This is the G.E. Moore shift to which I referred earlier.  Essentially, the theist will declare premise (1) of the preceding argument is false.  That is, it is entirely possible that god, being omnibenevolent, would still not want to eliminate all the evil in the world.  He might have an ultimately good, overriding reason for allowing such evil and suffering to exist.  This argument concedes the Problem of Evil argument is valid, but denies its soundness.  

So, what is this good, overriding reason?  Why, free will, of course!  The Free Will Defense is as follows:  

1) It is logically possible that an omnibenevolent god would have good reason to create beings with free will

2) Free will entails the possibility of evil

3) Therefore, it is possible that an omnibenevolent god would want to allow for the possibility of evil

A popular and probably the best defense.  It too, however, is not without its flaws.  In order for this argument to hold it must be shown that evil is necessary to bring about good; otherwise, there would be no overriding reason to allow evil to exist.  

There's a unique perspective on this I would like to offer.  Why couldn't god create a world of free beings that always choose to do right?  He is omnipotent, according to the theists, after all.  This is indeed possible, since it is possible for a person to choose right in one instance, they could choose right in all instances.  An objection to this might be: But, that's not free will!  Oh, I beg to differ.  It is free will.  Take, for example, a child and a cookie jar.  In one instance, his parents put the cookie jar in a place where the child is physically and otherwise unable to reach it.  In another instance, the parents instilled in the child discipline, and so they put the cookie jar in a place the child could reach it, but the child does not ever steal a cookie from it because he knows it is the wrong thing to do.  Similarly, in the first example, even if the child wanted to steal a cookie (which we see as wrong), he is physically unable to do so.  In the second case, the child is able to steal from the cookie jar, but always chooses not to because he knows it is wrong.  Can it now be seen why being instilled the ability to always choose right is not the same as not having free will? 

So, going back to the original question: why didn't god allow one of the assassination attempts on Hitler succeed?  A cynic would suggest it is because god doesn't exist.  A free will defender would suggest it's because god didn't want to interfere with free will.  An agnostic would suggest we cannot know god's nature so the question need not be asked.  I, on the other hand, would suggest that, if god exists, it's obvious it is not a utilitarian.  In all seriousness, though,  it's hard to see the greater good or purpose from the reign of Hitler unless you view god as an anti-Semite, which to at least two major religions is quite laughably contradictory.  The Westboro Baptists might agree with this, but they themselves are an example of evil.  I'm still not entire convinced that they're not just remarkably committed satirists.  Perhaps instead of shaking our fists at the sky asking why god would allow such atrocities to occur, we should be lambasting the failures of the Nazis to off Hitler when they had the chance.  Just a thought.